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II.3. The Deepening Crisis:  March 1938 – October 1938 
 
1938 is always seen as a watershed in the persecution of the ‘Jews’1 as it was the 
year when geopolitical changes brought more ‘Jews’ under German rule and when 
antisemitic policies were substantially radicalized. Yet even before the Anschluss, the 
Nazis were becoming increasingly worried about the slow pace of Jewish emigration. 
Their own policies, combined with immigration restrictions elsewhere, had served to 
limit the numbers able to leave. At the same time, Nazi strategy itself was 
contradictory, with the ‘Jews’ being pressed to leave while simultaneously being 
stripped of the assets that would have made them acceptable immigrants in other 
countries. Nevertheless, individual emigration remained the Nazi strategy for making 
Germany judenfrei and in general, everything possible was done to hasten the 
emigration of the – albeit increasingly impoverished – ‘Jews’. A number of official 
instructions were issued to facilitate this. For example, the police record of Jewish 
emigrants could be ‘cleansed’ to make them more acceptable to countries of 
immigration. Professional qualifications that were in demand were also included on 
passports, and the Handwerkskammern were authorised to issue papers certifying 
the professional knowledge of Jewish emigrants.2 
A partial solution to the fundamental contradictions in Nazi policy was found in 
more overt state violence and schemes for collective forced emigration that removed 
individual initiative or choice in destination. The latter element was tried at the 
beginning of 1938. Five hundred ‘Jews’ with Soviet passports were ordered to leave 
the country. As the Soviet Union would not permit their repatriation, and since 
Germany had no common frontier with the Soviet Union, transit visas were required 
from third countries, but these were all refused. As a result, the experiment failed and 
in May 1938, all Soviet ‘Jews’ still residing in Germany were arrested and held in 
concentration camps until they could organise their emigration. Their possessions 
were seized until the moment they left the country and they were given Fremden or 
Nansen Passports to facilitate their departure.3 
In the meantime, the first expansion of Hitler’s Germany had taken place with 
the Anschluss of Austria and its incorporation into the Reich. This had provoked a 
flight of political activists, albeit on much smaller scale than from Germany in 1933. 
The Austrian corporate state had already persecuted the parties of the left and their 
political activists had been emigrating since the coup of 12 February 1934. In 1938, 
former German émigrés who had found refuge in Austria after 1933, Austrian 
Socialist and communist activists, and even a small group of Austrian conservative 
opponents of National-Socialism chose the path into exile.4  However, the vast 
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majority of refugees from Austria were ‘Jews’. The Anschluss prompted an almost 
immediate and unprecedented wave of violence against the ‘Jews’ in Vienna. 
Administratively, all the antisemitic legislation enacted in Germany over the previous 
five years was imposed overnight. In contrast to the Altreich, the SS took a much 
more prominent role in the organisation of antisemitic actions in Austria. Within a very 
short time, Adolf Eichmann had established the Zentralstelle für judische 
Auswanderung, (Central Office for Jewish Emigration) an organisation that 
systematically deprived the ‘Jews’ of their assets, made sure they complied with all 
the antisemitic legislation, and provided them with the barest minimum of resources 
to expedite their emigration from the Reich.5  This radical dynamism was in direct 
response to the perception that the piecemeal persecution of the ‘Jews’ carried out in 
the Altreich had failed in removing them from Germany as expeditiously as possible.   
The ‘success’ of the Zentralstelle, albeit in combination with a high level of 
terror, was spectacular when compared with the limited numbers of emigrants then 
leaving Germany. Nearly 50,000 ‘Jews’ left Austria in the first six months after the 
Anschluss.6 Even given this level of terror and the fact that Eichmann benefited from 
an initial emigration of people with limited attachment to Austria, the idea that 
coercive pressure might be combined with a greater degree of administrative 
collusion was novel, but one that clearly got results. ‘Jews’ would now receive the 
necessary travel documents and police certificates required by countries of 
emigration, rather than being left to the whim of individual bureaucrats. However, 
even this success was not considered sufficient and, as pressures to make Austria 
judenrein mounted but opportunities for legal emigration became ever more severely 
restricted, the German police and border authorities increasingly flouted international 
law and local conventions by dumping ‘Jews’ across the frontiers of neighbouring 
countries.7  
In the aftermath of the Anschluss, Hermann Goering took steps to regulate 
what had become a scramble for Jewish assets. The widespread profiteering that 
had taken place in Austria could not be allowed to continue, or be spread to 
Germany. The state had good financial reasons for wanting its share of every 
available asset in the country. In April 1938 all Jewish Property had to be registered 
and it could henceforward only be sold or leased with permission from the authorities. 
In this way, the state could keep track of assets that might otherwise have fallen into 
private hands undetected. During 1938 the ‘Jews’ were increasingly excluded from 
the German economy and the impoverishment of the ‘Jews’ threatened to add to the 
state’s welfare burden. In the meantime, the Evian Refugee Conference had come 
and gone without result. There was to be no international solution to the question and 
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the pressures on the ‘Jews’ continued to escalate. There was widespread antisemitic 
violence in the cities and June 1938 saw a wave of 10,000 arrests of a-socials, 
including so-called ‘Jewish criminals’, encompassing anyone who had been 
convicted by the courts, even for minor offences, at some time in the past. Some 
1,500 Jewish men were taken to Buchenwald concentration camps and told that they 
would not be released until they were able to emigrate.8  
The practical outcome of Munich Settlement of 29 September 1938 was also 
a major watershed. German annexation of the Sudetenland caused a considerable 
flow of political activists to the unoccupied part of Czechoslovakia, including at least 
5,000 anti-Nazi Germans. The 30,000 ‘Jews’ resident in the Sudeten areas 
transferred to German control were forcibly arrested and expelled to Czechoslovakia. 
The Czechs refused to accept them and sent them on to Hungary, who in turn 
returned them to German soil. This continued until some ended up on a riverboat in 
the Danube and others in no-mans-land at Mischdorf, between Czechoslovakia and 
Hungary.9 In the meantime, the newly autonomous Slovak state decreed that all non-
Slovak Jews would have to leave the Slovak territory by 31 January 1939, while the 
Czech government decided that all German ‘Jews’ had to leave by 15 January 
1939.10  
 
The expansion of the German Reich and the radicalisation of antisemitic 
policy, served to increase the steady flow of refugees from Nazi controlled areas into 
a flood. Most countries surrounding Germany were subject to a form of human 
‘dumping’. In addition, in Italy and in Eastern Europe, Jews were threatened and 
under pressure to emigrate. Until March 1938 the Fascist government in Italy had not 
limited the entry of Jewish refugees. On the contrary Mussolini had granted asylum to 
German ‘Jews’ for diplomatic reasons, seeing Italy as the balance between Germany 
and the Western Powers. Italy also had no legislation to prevent foreigners from 
working and earning a living in the country.11 From 1935 onwards this began to 
change as Italy and Nazi Germany became closer. In September 1938, Italy enacted 
anti-Jewish laws. Foreign Jews who had settled in Italy after 1 January 1919 had to 
leave the country within six months, that is, by the 12 March 1939.12 
Slightly in advance of Italy, the Polish government embarked on a similar 
path. After the death of Marshal Josef Pilsudski in 1935, policies to tackle the 
country’s ‘Jewish problem’ was extensively discussed among the Polish governing 
elite headed by Marshal Edouard Rydz-Smigly. The 3.5 million Jews in Poland in 
1935 -10 percent of the population – were mostly urban and concentrated in the 
commercial sector and the liberal professions, both of which had been badly hit by 
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the Depression. The Polish regime embarked on a nationalist program in which the 
emigration of the Jewish minority figured prominently. The first coercive measure 
came in 1938 with a law that provided for the possibility that Poles who had lived 
outside Poland for more than five years and had shown no signs of attachment to 
their country of origin could be denationalised. Although the law did not specifically 
mention the Jews, they were undoubtedly the intended targets since the Polish 
government was determined to prevent the return of the 50,000 Polish ‘Jews’ still in 
Greater Germany who were threatened with expulsion. The Hungarian government 
followed suit and voted legislation by which Hungarian Jews living abroad could be 
stripped of their citizenship. All liberal states in Europe, fearing much greater refugee 
effluxes from Eastern Europe adopted a firm stand against any attempts by these 
states with much larger Jewish populations to begin a policy of eviction. However 
diplomatic considerations - making these countries into allies and preventing them 
from slipping into the Nazi camp - meant that the message about Western objections 
to policies against the Jews was not always clearly received.13   
In October 1938, Warsaw decided that all Polish citizens living abroad had to 
renew their papers, and if they did not do so their citizenship could be revoked. The 
first to react were the German authorities as they were aware that they were the chief 
targets of the Polish legislation. To pre-empt the creation of many thousands of 
stateless ‘Jews’, Himmler ordered the rounding up of all male Polish ‘Jews’ and their 
deportation to Poland by 29 October. Wives and children would have to follow. The 
Polish authorities reacted swiftly by closing their border. As a result about 16,000 
‘Jews’ succeeded in entering Polish territory, while 6,500 Polish ‘Jews’ were stuck in 
no-man’s-land at Zbaszyn. Although some were later allowed to return, some 20,000 
‘Jews’ were removed from German territory.14 This chaotic outcome of this 
experiment nevertheless taught the German authorities that any future mass 
deportations would have to be better prepared.  
 
The Confidence of the European liberal states in ‘Remote Control’ 
 
The Anschluss on 11 March 1938 and fears of a new wave of refugees meant that 
several western European states adjusted their policies almost immediately by 
introducing visa requirements that served to strengthen their remote controls and 
ensured that only a selected number of refugees could enter their territory legally. It 
had proven to be very difficult to make refugees leave once they were inside the 
country so preventing them from arriving there in the first place was considered the 
most effective strategy. 
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By the end of March 1938, a few hundred Austrians were already being 
assisted by the Jewish refugee organisation in Switzerland. As those who were 
capable of supporting themselves did not need the help of refugee organisations, the 
numbers in the country must have been somewhat larger.  From 1 April 1938 
onwards, former Austrian citizens were required to apply for visas. As there was no 
longer an Austrian state, the Swiss were able to act unilaterally and promptly without 
any fear of international retribution. The British authorities were pushed into action by 
similar concerns. On the day of the Anschluss, the Jewish Refugees’ Committee 
announced that it was unable to accept financial responsibility for any future entrants. 
The blank cheque that the Jewish organisations had freely issued in 1933 - a time 
when they had not foreseen the possible explosion in refugee numbers - was 
withdrawn. The Jewish refugee relief organisation insisted on a right to choose those 
it would support and thus ended its unlimited guarantee. This served to strengthen 
the British government’s determination to control immigration from Germany. By 2 
May 1938, the Home Office had imposed immediate visa requirements for all 
Austrian nationals, but properly notified its intention to do the same for German 
passport holders as the German government was entitled to reasonable notice of 
termination of the existing agreement. The Germans went to great lengths to 
accommodate British interests during negotiations with the Foreign Ministry in 
London. They proposed that an aspiring emigrant would only get a passport valid for 
the UK if (s)he could show written evidence that the British government had 
authorised admission. This did not meet the demands of the British authorities as 
only those Germans who intended to leave directly from Germany for Britain would 
be pre-selected. All other Germans who succeeded in leaving Germany would be 
free to enter Britain. Beside this more pragmatic consideration the British authorities 
also considered this proposal unacceptable in principle. The British did not want to 
outsource their immigration control to the Germans, as this would imply collusion with 
Berlin ‘to detain people in the Reich’.15 Visas for Germans coming to Britain became 
mandatory from 21 May 1938 onwards. 
News of these decisions, coupled with Sweden and Norway also imposing a 
visa obligation for Austrian passport holders caused the Danish Chief of Police Eigil 
Thune Jacobsen to insist on taking similar measures.16 Since the Anschluss he had 
monitored the arrival of Austrians very closely. There had, in fact, been few arrivals 
and thus no immediate cause for alarm, but he feared that as Great Britain, 
Switzerland and the two neighbouring Scandinavian countries introduced visa 
requirements, Denmark would be a more likely destination for those fleeing Austria. 
He argued that Denmark, as the gate to Scandinavia, shouldered a heavy 
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responsibility, but the Danish Foreign Office was reticent about imposing a visa 
requirement as this might adversely affect relations with Germany. When the 
Germans informed the Danish authorities that Austrian passports were being 
replaced by German documents from 15 August 1938 onwards and the former would 
be deemed invalid by the German authorities from 1 January 1939 onwards, a visa 
obligation for holders of Austrian passports was introduced in July 1938 as the 
Danish Foreign Office withdrew its opposition.17 The Dutch were less charitable to 
former Austrians citizens than their Danish counterparts. The Dutch Foreign Ministry 
was convinced that Austrian citizens would soon be issued with German papers and 
should be treated accordingly. Thus as early as 22 March 1938, the Dutch decided 
that Austrian passports were no longer valid travel documents.18 The imposition of 
visa requirements during the Spring and Summer of 1938 meant that many more 
people from Austria and Germany had to obtain visas before entering France, 
Belgium, Denmark, Sweden, Norway and the United Kingdom. Confidence in this 
system for controlling immigration was again evident when, from September 1938 
onwards, Italy and Czechoslovakia became sources of refugees. The authorities in 
several countries made access for Italians, Czechs and Slovaks to their territory 
more difficult by imposing a visa requirement.19  
A new mechanism of remote control was introduced in early autumn 1938 
when the Danish authorities, determined to stop the ‘abuse’ of temporary residence 
authorizations by German ‘Jews’, decreed that Germans admitted as temporary 
visitors would no longer be able to apply to settle in Denmark, even if they had 
enough means at their disposal, but would be obliged to leave the country in order to 
obtain a settlement visa from a Danish consulate abroad.  The Netherlands had 
already introduced a similar scheme in March 1938. Germans who had entered the 
Netherlands as temporary visitors could only settle in the country if they had applied 
abroad for an authorization to do so.20 In this way, the Dutch and Danish authorities 
preserved unrestricted travel between their country and Germany, but at the same 
time prevented refugees from staying legally beyond the validity of their visa. This 
new arrangement precluded jeopardizing relations with Germany and it became 
popular as a policy all over Europe. The Belgian authorities, albeit already having the 
means to control all immigration from their consulates in Germany, saw the 
advantages of a second barrier in order to discourage anyone overstaying their visa. 
Thus from the autumn of 1938 onwards, the Belgian authorities prohibited the use of 
tourist visas for settlement purposes; foreigners wanting to settle in Belgium also had 
to leave the country first and apply abroad for a settlement visa.21  
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The visa requirements, be it for entry or for settlement imposed across 
Western Europe were designed to stem the influx of uninvited aliens. Visa 
applications from German or Austrian ‘Jews’, even those with moveable wealth, were 
looked on unfavourably and the vast majority were refused. Analysis of administrative 
practice clearly shows that the Jewish applicants were singled out for special 
scrutiny, based not so much on antisemitic or xenophobic feelings, but rather on a 
‘rational’ bureaucratic reasoning that applicants had to be treated on their merits and 
on the likelihood that they would actually return to their country of origin. In this 
respect, such an assessment was compatible with the liberalism of these regimes 
bordering Germany. All West European countries refused visitors’ visa to Germans 
and Austrians whom they suspected of wanting to remain in the country. Only a small 
minority of wealthy refugees whose immigration was considered in the interest of the 
country concerned were granted the necessary permits.22 In addition, applications for 
(temporary) residence were sometimes approved when the individuals concerned 
could show they were able to leave for a destination overseas almost immediately.23 
A final category looked on more sympathetically were those with very close links to 
the country concerned.24  
With the phasing out of Austrian passports, emigration from Austria to 
Switzerland and Scandinavia was no longer subject to visa control. Only by imposing 
a visa obligation on the holders of Germans passports could external control on 
immigration from Austria be retained. Switzerland (and Sweden) thus informed the 
German authorities that they wanted to impose a visa obligation on all German 
nationals. For their part, the German authorities made persistent efforts to avoid any 
travel restrictions for its ‘aryan’ citizens, let alone the imposition of visas. Although the 
negotiations were separate, the Swiss and Swedish objectives were similar, namely 
to have a technical means to identify (and exclude) those - overwhelmingly ‘Jews’ - 
seeking entry into their countries with the intention of staying. At first, the Nazis 
opposed the idea, as it would make getting rid of the ‘Jews’ more difficult. However 
when it became clear that this was the only way ‘aryan’ Germans would remain free 
from the requirement to obtain a visa, they conceded. This led to a new passport for 
German ‘Jews’ that included a three centimetres high red letter ‘J’, on the left-hand 
side of the first page indicating their ‘non-aryan’ status.25 All German ‘Jews’ had to 
exchange their old passport for a new passport by 22 December 1938 and by 7 
October 1938 all Austrian passports held by ‘Jews’ had also to be marked with a ‘J’. 
In the meantime, the Swiss introduced a new visa requirement for the holders of the 
new Jewish passports, effective from the 6 October onwards.26 This ‘J' stamp was 
thus introduced by the Germans at the behest of the Swiss authorities to distinguish 
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between Germans who did not have to carry a visa and those who did. Although the 
Swiss authorities introduced a clear-cut racial bias in their system, the authorities in 
the other liberal states were also not entirely free of antisemitism and even racism in 
their daily management of immigration. The denial of visa applications from Jews 
became routine in most consulates. Moreover, this attitude went beyond the German 
refugee crisis. Although the Polish authorities had given assurances that Polish Jews 
in Western Europe were not the intended targets of the Polish decree of 31 March 
1938 designed to deprive Poles abroad of their citizenship the immediate result was 
that Polish Jews were very rarely granted visas by any country.27   
The category of ‘Jew’ also filtered through into the policy discussions of the 
authorities of the countries neighbouring Germany. For example, German ‘Jews’ 
were listed separately in the Dutch and Luxemburg immigration statistics for internal 
use.28 The adoption of Nazi racial categorisation and Nazi terminology also 
penetrated the top level of decision making in Western European regimes. The 
guidelines for granting of visa are a clear case in point. These instructions served to 
make it far more difficult for ‘Jews’ than non-Jews to obtain visas. Mostly they were 
couched in moderate language and refrained from open use of antisemitic or racist 
language. Consulates were told to refuse visas to those applicants who wanted to 
settle in the country without having enough means to do so using ethnically and 
racially neutral terms, but in more detailed instructions one can see the use of coded 
language and even the term ‘non-aryan’.29 
This overview of how external controls were imposed shows that all countries 
wanted to exercise a much tighter grip on immigration through their consular 
services. Remote control had the great advantage that the pressure of decision-
making was shifted away from the borders and now took place outside the country. 
Remote control was not necessarily meant to exclude refugees altogether, but to 
keep the flow at manageable levels. Consular instructions were sometimes explicit in 
saying that visa applications from political refugees were to be handled in a liberal 
manner.30 Several thousand British visas were granted to German and Austrian 
subjects during the Spring and Summer of 1938,31 including renewable permits for 
Jewish women to be employed as domestic servants in British households, and male 
Jewish entrepreneurs investing in Great Britain.32 Most Austrians and Germans 
entering Great Britain were refugees who had private sponsors and intended to re-
emigrate. The Jewish refugee organisations ceased to underwrite admissions 
generally, but created guarantee funds supported by people in Britain. Once an 
arrangement had been agreed, the sponsor had to deposit actual sums of money 
and to sign guarantees to defray costs of maintenance and re-emigration before the 
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authorities granted a visa. Nevertheless, huge bottlenecks rapidly grew in the system 
for handling visa applications, and this served to delay the admission of many 
refugees to Great Britain.  
Continental countries were seemingly less generous, as visas for these 
countries were granted only sparingly. However the porous nature of their borders 
made them much less capable of controlling the refugees entering their territory.33 
Thus, an important aspect of their migration control scheme was a strict border and 
internal control policy, including the use of expulsion, as would be-immigrants would 
only respect the regulations if there was a high risk of being caught as an illegal 
resident. In addition to their remote control policies, the liberal states neighbouring 
Nazi Germany wanted to retain the right to repatriate unwanted immigrants, including 
those whose visas had expired. Thus, for example, a basic requirement for obtaining 
a Belgian visa from May 1938 onwards was that the holder’s German passport was 
still valid for 5 years. In this way Germans who had resided lawfully in Belgium for 
several years could be deported as soon as they no longer satisfied the conditions by 
which they had entered.34 The countries of continental Europe were therefore less 
confident in remote control as a means of stemming the refugee flow than Great 
Britain and insisted on extra control mechanisms.  
 
The desire to exclude Jewish refugees at the border  
 
In most countries, tighter frontier controls had been discussed during the course of 
1937 but it was not until after the Anschluss that they were implemented. Officials 
had already been under strict instructions to turn away all foreigners without papers, 
but their competences were increased considerably after March 1938. Given its 
geographical position and linguistic affinity to Austria, Switzerland was the first state 
to experience the arrival of refugees, and also the first to strengthen its border 
controls. By the late spring, the authorities in other continental countries also noticed 
an increasing pressure at their borders. More and more people arrived from Austria 
without visas. A swift response followed. In May 1938, Luxemburg strengthened its 
frontier policing and mobilised the army to offset a shortage of suitable personnel. By 
July 1938, Belgium had supplemented its border police with 160 policemen stationed 
on the eastern frontier and mobile units on bicycles, popularly known in the border 
region as the ‘Jew hunters’. The Netherlands deployed an extra 300 additional border 
guards and in France, police reinforcements were send to the border early in June, 
followed in July 1938 by the brigades de gendarmerie frontière with 1500 men who 
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were assigned to securing the borders. In September 1938, Danish border control 
was also strengthened.35  
Facilities for asylum seekers remained in place in all Continental European 
countries. In Switzerland, Austrians who had arrived after 28 March 1938 without the 
necessary visa (or prior to this without a passport), but who could make a plausible 
case that they were in mortal danger were treated as applicants for refugee status.36 
Numerous Jewish refugees who arrived at the Swiss border during the Spring and 
early Summer of 1938 were neither sent back by the Swiss central authorities nor 
considered eligible for refugee status. If they could prove they had been threatened 
with incarceration in a concentration camp, they were given temporary permission to 
stay.37 Sometimes these ‘Jewish’ refugees were pushed on into France. The Swiss 
Jewish refugee organisations could even pass on refugees to France legally by an 
arrangement with some French departmental authorities.38 Initially, all countries kept 
to a generous admission policy in line with pre-1938 policy, distinguishing between 
permanent protection for ‘refugees’ and temporary protection for ‘Jews’. Very soon 
this would all change.  
In the Netherlands there was still no question of any formal asylum for 
refugees, but even providing temporary protection was brought into question shortly 
after the Anschluss. From March 1938 onwards, holders of Austrian passports 
arriving at the Dutch border were all refused access to Dutch territory. German 
passport holders could only be admitted if they had an official declaration that they 
could return at any time to Germany. The repatriation of such immigrants had to 
remain possible. The value of the assets they had to dispose of before being allowed 
to enter the Netherlands had also been considerably increased. This measure by the 
Dutch government was aimed specifically at German Jews, but as the issue was 
considered a particularly sensitive one, all Germans were subjected to the new rule. 
An exception was made for refugees. Even people without papers arriving at the 
Dutch border were to be admitted if they could prove that they were in mortal danger. 
Additional instructions were issued in May 1938 that talked not of mortal danger but 
‘imminent mortal danger’ as being the only criterion for admission of people without 
papers. Restrictionism nevertheless went beyond this semantic change. The May 
1938 circular letter abandoned all euphemistic language: there was no longer any 
question of scrutinizing all Germans’ travel plans, but it was stated explicitly that 
refugees, foreigners who had to leave their country ‘under the pressure of 
circumstance’, were to be considered as unwanted guests. Administrative practice 
was changed accordingly. While ‘ordinary’ German travellers were less severely 
scrutinised at the frontier, refugees were blatantly refused admission and even the 
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possession of sufficient means of support was no longer accepted as a justification 
for admission. Only in few cases, where the Nazis had physically chased individuals 
across the border – thus substantiating the criteria of imminent mortal danger - could 
entry be granted.39 
In all other liberal states of Western Europe arriving Jewish refugees were still 
temporarily protected. The German dumping policy nonetheless placed great strains 
on this humanitarian policy. The high pressure on Jews to leave Austria meant that 
any rumour of an opportunity to emigrate was seized upon. According to interviews 
with Jewish refugees conducted by the French police, some Aachen residents had 
promised, out of greed, to assist Austrian ‘Jews’ in their flight abroad and the word 
had spread in Vienna. Other sources mention a rumour that the Joint had set up an 
aid committee in Brussels for Austrian Jews. As a result, a large number of Austrian 
‘Jews’ flocked to Aachen and some tried to cross into Belgium where they were 
apprehended by the Belgian border guards. The German authorities decided to 
incarcerate the Austrian ‘Jews’ and while in the local prison, they were issued with 
short-term German passports and made to sign a declaration that they would never 
return to Germany. On the night of 22 May 1938, the German police sent fifty ‘Jews’ 
to Luxemburg. The following nights other batches of Jewish refugees were sent to 
Belgium and France, and possibly also to the Netherlands.40  
While the Belgian authorities offered to protect those refugees who had 
circumvented its border guards and whom the Jewish refugee committees agreed to 
support, the Luxemburg authorities wanted to show the German authorities that 
dumping these people into Luxemburg was unacceptable. The Luxemburg authorities 
thus rounded up the fifty ‘Jews’ , although the Jewish refugee committee had taken 
care of them. They were assembled at the military barracks in Luxemburg city, and 
then during the day brought them under military escort to the Remich bridge and 
handed over to German border guards. During this whole operation the soldiers were 
confronted with the despair of these refugees who tried to demonstrate that they 
could not return to Germany: one jumped into the Moselle and another tried to 
commit suicide with a razor.41  
This example of gesture politics backfired as the Luxemburg government was 
castigated by the press and was strongly criticised for its inhuman treatment of these 
particular refugees. Even the American Joint Distribution Committee (JDC) 
intervened with the Luxemburg government - as Yehuda Bauer makes clear, a very 
rare thing for JDC to have done - to stop further expulsions. 42The fact that the 
expulsions had been ordered by the Minister in charge, the Socialist René Blum 
meant that liberal elements in the Luxemburg political elite made no public protests. 
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However, the experiment was not considered a success and alternatives to 
deportation such as internment were immediately discussed in government circles. 
The JDC provided undertakings to enable the local Jewish community to support 
refugees and assist them in finding countries of immigration overseas. The traditional 
policy of temporarily protecting refugees was thereby restored in the Grand Duchy 
and ‘Jews’ whom the local Jewish refugee committee were ready to support were 
admitted until they could organize their final emigration.  
French border authorities were nevertheless inspired by the actions of their 
Luxembourgeois counterparts. When the fifty Austrian refugees who had been 
returned to Germany on 23 May by the Luxemburg authorities were dumped in small 
groups in France the following night they were arrested by the French border 
authorities. The next day they were returned in an official convoy along the main road 
to the German border so as to impress the German authorities. The official in charge 
executed these orders without any remorse and he pointed out that these ‘Jews’ 
protested dramatically, but he qualified them as ‘ruined traders, Jews wanting to 
leave for abroad and victims of vengeance by their neighbours’. They were definitely 
not political refugees and could thus be returned.43 As this French repatriation 
operation took place in the border region, it received no media and there were no 
civic protests.   
A month later, in June 1938, the Danish Chief of Police Eigil Thune Jacobsen 
instructed the border police to hold Germans for questioning at the Danish border. 
They had to be interviewed about their destination, their family background and their 
economic means. Even travellers with Eastern European and Austrian passports 
containing the necessary visa were to be subjected to this control. With this 
information, the local police chiefs could then decide, usually after consultation with 
Copenhagen, whether these travellers really wanted to settle in Denmark and 
whether they possessed sufficient means to finance a permanent stay. As was the 
case in the Netherlands, the measure was implicitly directed against the ‘Jewish’ 
refugees from Nazi Germany. Suspicion of wanting to settle in Denmark was based 
on factors such as having so-called ‘semitic’ facial expressions or travelling with 
family-members and/or with a lot of baggage. The border control was so strict that 
the German ambassador in Copenhagen was moved to lodge a formal complaint 
against the long interrogations and resulting delays that all German travellers, in 
contrast to other foreigners, had to endure at the Danish border.44  
On 12 September 1938, the Swedish authorities decided to impose stricter 
controls on the influx of ‘Jewish’ refugees: although Germans did not need a visa to 
enter Sweden those whom the border guards suspected of wanting to settle in 
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Sweden were to be refused access unless they had a so-called border 
recommendation of a Swedish consulate, a quasi-visa for German ‘Jews‘ introduced 
to pre-select refugees.45  The Swedish example, together with the knowledge that the 
financial reserves of the Jewish aid committee were dwindling, and that existing 
Jewish refugees in the country would eventually become a public charge moved the 
issue to the fore. Thus on 29 September 1938, the Danish council of ministers 
confirmed Jacobson’s  administrative directive of June 1938. Instructions were sent 
to the border guards and to consuls abroad to refuse entry to foreigners ‘who, having 
left their country of origin with the intention of emigrating due to the difficulty of their 
situation, could not or did not wish to return to their country of origin’. Only if they had 
an entry permit authorised by the Ministry of Justice or a visa allowing them entry into 
a third country were they to be admitted. The radical strengthening of the border 
controls with regard to German ‘Jews’ thus became official policy.46 Only ‘persons 
who, due to political activities or political convictions, were liable to severe 
punishment should they remain in their country of origin’ had to be protected. The 
official support for the strengthening of these border policies set the tone for the 
future. In a few cases the border guards even refused German ‘Jews’ who had a 
valid entry visa admission into Denmark. Likewise, Germans who had permission 
from the Danish consulate in Berlin to work in Denmark were refused entrance at the 
border when it became clear that these workers were regarded as ‘Jews’ in Germany 
and that they therefore came under the stricter regulations applied to German 
‘Jews’.47 This ‘mistake’ by the Danish consulate in Berlin illustrates perfectly the 
difficult assignment given to both Danish and Dutch frontier guards:  to allow ‘bona 
fide’ travellers in while excluding Jewish immigrants. 
By the middle of August, the Swiss and Luxemburg authorities had rescinded 
the temporary protection for ‘Jewish’ refugees and orders were given to close the 
borders, except for political refugees. The Swiss border police was instructed to hand 
back to the German authorities those Austrians who attempted to cross into 
Switzerland without the necessary visa. The official excuse for this change of policy 
was that the German authorities would otherwise punish these refugees, as their 
involuntary return could not be documented. In fact, the real reason for this change 
was to improve efficiency rather than for any humanitarian concern. From 7 
September 1938 onwards, the number of forced returnees increased as Swiss border 
officials were instructed to refuse entry to German ‘Jews’. Even those with valid 
passports were kept out, although the rules in force indicated that they were, in fact, 
qualified to enter Switzerland.48 Although we have no conclusive evidence, it seems  
that France closed its borders on 18 August 1938 for ‘Jewish’ refugees, this did not 
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imply that that these refugees were deported indiscriminately to Greater Germany, 
France had a preference for sending them on to neighbouring countries.49 
Switzerland strongly opposed this policy and reinforced its border controls at the 
Swiss-French border. The Belgian authorities were similarly indignant that their ally in 
devising an international refugee regime was now flouting its provisions. Thus from 
May 1938 onwards, refugees caught at the French-Belgian border attempting to 
enter illegally were returned to France and protests were made to the French 
authorities for not respecting the international refugee laws to which France had 
adhered. This attempt to take the moral high ground cut little ice with the French, who 
recalled the Belgian policy in 1933 of pushing their refugees into France. 50 However, 
this episode did serve to highlight the weakness of the French strategy of denying 
protection to refugees, but refusing to repatriate them back to Germany.   
During the summer of 1938, the border authorities in those countries which 
had no visa requirement as a remote control mechanism had to investigate whether 
the would-be immigrants from Greater Germany were considered Jewish by the 
Nazis. The well-researched Danish and Swiss cases show that putting this policy into 
practice proved extremely difficult: it remained difficult to tell ‘Jews’ from other 
immigrants at the border, as passports bore no indication as to the bearer’s religious 
denomination, let alone his or her racial categorization. Travellers from Germany 
faced close interrogations at the borders to find out if they were Jewish and, if so, 
whether they qualified for entrance. Admission at these borders was discretionary 
and not set out clearly in published regulations. This meant that many refugees 
arrived at these frontiers not knowing if they would be admitted. Not only did the 
Dutch, Danish, Swiss and Luxemburg authorities have to deploy increasing 
resources to guard their frontiers, but they also placed great strain on their border 
and customs officials in having to carry out this exclusionary policy. Harrowing 
scenes at the border posts became daily occurrences. Threats of suicide that could 
easily become a reality only added to the border guards becoming desensitised. 
Confronted with the stubbornness of desperate refugees many lost any sympathy 
they might have had with the refugees and increasingly employed brutal methods to 
implement their instructions.51 The authorities realized that their border guards had a 
difficult assignment and they tried to give them some further assistance. For 
example, from September 1938 onwards, the Swiss border guards had to stamp as 
having been ‘turned back’ the passports of Germans whom they considered as 
‘Jews’ and had refused entry to Switzerland. In this way their colleagues at other 
border crossing points no longer had to decide themselves that these Germans were 
unwanted immigrants.52  
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While France, Belgium and to a lesser extent Great Britain due to its geographical 
position, had to increase the policing of their frontiers, they did have the advantage of 
a clearly delineated set of regulations for entry. Border guards did not have to 
conduct investigations to find out whether a would-be visitor from Greater Germany 
was a bona fide tourist or an immigrant. The burden of initial face-to-face contact with 
applicants had been shifted abroad to the consular officials who handled visa 
applications. For the border guards a visa requirement could make control of border 
crossings a bureaucratic routine. Yet even in countries where remote control was 
well developed and an effective administrative barrier to entrance, border authorities 
were still charged with exempting ‘refugees’ from the regulations.53 In France, a 
decree law of 2 May 1938 stipulated that illegal aliens who petitioned for asylum 
upon their arrival in France had to receive an administrative hearing. No legislation 
was introduced to provide eligibility criteria for refugee status, but internal instructions 
for police use stipulated some principles of French asylum policy. France had to be 
the first country of asylum, so admission had to be refused to foreigners coming from 
a third country where they could have requested asylum, and those previously 
expelled were also excluded. Central to the definition of a refugee was evidence of 
forced departure because of a danger to life and the complete loss of possessions. 
The border guards had to grant access to those foreigners who could provide outline 
proof that made their status as a refugee plausible. These admissible asylum 
seekers were then sent to a municipality were they were granted (renewable) 
residence permits valid for a month. In the meantime the Minister of Interior 
investigated, on the basis of additional information, whether the applicant was eligible 
for refugee status.54  
Notwithstanding the guarantees afforded to ‘refugees’ it seems that only a few 
people actually declared themselves as refugees to the border authorities. Germans 
and Austrians, and later also Italian and Czech nationals were reluctant to do so if 
they saw a chance to gain admission by normal means. They had little faith in the 
authorities of the countries to which they fled and were too afraid of being sent back 
to Germany if their petition for refugee status ultimately failed. Political as well as 
‘Jewish’ refugees only declared themselves voluntarily to the authorities of the 
country of refuge after contacting ‘their’ refugee committees within the country of 
asylum. Armed with some local, albeit private protection and already inside the 
country they hoped to have a greater chance of being protected.  
  Although more systematic research needs to be done on the practical 
applications of policy at the border to compare and contrast with the well-
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documented Danish and Swiss cases, the findings suggest that border officials of all 
Continental European countries were directly involved in denying access to (‘Jewish’) 
immigrants. Judgements on both ‘Jews’ and ‘aryans’ arriving from Germany and 
Austria, with or without the right papers, became a routine task for border guards 
from the summer of 1938 onwards. ‘Jewish’ refugees were turned away at the 
Western borders of Germany in droves, albeit that border officials still had 
considerable discretion in these decisions.55In the countries that refused to impose a 
visa requirement on the Germans for economic and political reasons, the discretion 
given to border guards was much wider. These countries had to persist with an ad 
hoc and unsatisfactory compromise that nominally kept the border open, but 
effectively excluded a large number of people who wished to cross it but whom the 
border guards treated as unwanted ‘Jewish’ refugees. In countries with decentralized 
border controls such as Denmark and the Netherlands, border control was much less 
homogeneous and it was local authorities who decided on who was an unwanted 
immigrant and also who could eventually qualify for refugee status.56 
No matter how stringent the security measures at the border were, they were 
incapable of securing the frontiers altogether. For all kind of motives, border guards 
sometimes turned a blind eye when refugees sought to cross the border, or in some 
cases even provided assistance.57 Other refugees were able to circumvent border 
control altogether, and still others entered with a tourist visa or met other criteria of 
entrance and then stayed on, legally, quasi-legally, or illegally. The statistics of the 
Jewish refugee aid committees and the authorities (graph 2 and 3)58 clearly illustrate 
that there was an increasing number of mainly Austrian ‘Jews’ arriving in the Spring 
and Summer of 1938 who had been able either to circumvent frontier controls 
altogether or who had convinced the border guards that they met the criteria for 
entrance. For whatever reasons, efforts by the Western liberal states to stave off 
further influxes of uninvited foreigners were by no means totally successfully. Illegal 
immigration had not been uncommon before 1938, with both ‘Jewish’ and political 
activists contriving to avoid border controls, either because they did not have valid 
documents or the necessary means, but during and after 1938, the scale of this 
immigration increased enormously, as did the types of people involved. Now it was 
not just young and single males who were involved, but respectable bourgeois 
‘Jewish’ families from Germany desperate to do anything to escape from the Nazis. 
Increasingly, there was a trade in people across the ‘green frontiers’ from Germany 













































































Denmark (aliens police's figures concerning all refugees)
Dutch Jewish Committee (average based on total for 1-9.1938) 
Belgian Jewish committees (until 10.1938 aliens police's figures on Jewish refugees, from 8.1938 onwards Brusels and Antwerp Jewish committee)
French Jewish committees (1938 only Paris)
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Internal control    
 
Immediately after the Anschluss, once refugees had arrived in one of the liberal 
states of Europe the old policy of providing some form of protection remained, 
although controls became stricter. From 1938 onwards, refugees were admitted to 
Great Britain with (renewable) three-month permits and in France permits valid for 
one month. In the Netherlands after March 1938, German travellers with papers and 
means obtained permits for no more than fourteen days that were non-renewable.59 
All foreigners living legally (and illegally) in the Western liberal states were subject to 
greater administrative control and refugees became a particular focus. This is most 
conspicuously illustrated by the Dutch case. Earlier in the twentieth century, the 
Netherlands had been a country of emigration rather than immigration, and this 
caused it to be relatively lax in updating its controls on aliens. Thus it was the refugee 
crisis of the 1930s that became the catalyst for the first fully-fledged Dutch 
immigration control. Work permits had been introduced by the mid-1930s. By 
October 1938 internal controls had been considerably strengthened with all citizens 
obliged to inform the police authorities within 24 hours of the presence of foreigners 
in their homes. Before then, this obligation had existed only for hotels and 
guesthouses.60 On 19 December 1938, the administrative web began closing around 
transit-refugees. ‘Jews’ and other ‘non-aryan’ refugees who had arrived in the 
Netherlands after 1 March 1938 could no longer be registered in the aliens’ register. 
They had to be registered in a newly created central refugee register that allowed the 
authorities to monitor them even more closely.61 
 
The Protection of Political Refugees: A Sacrosanct Principle of Liberal States 
 
In the aftermath of the Anschluss, the French authorities allowed all resident and 
newly arrived Austrians to express their dissatisfaction with the German annexation 
of their country by signing a declaration that they refused to be covered by German 
diplomatic protection. In this way, the French authorities effectively reinforced the 
idea that these immigrants still claimed their (temporarily suspended) Austrian 
citizenship. On their French identity papers they were listed as Ex-Autrichien. This 
administrative categorization, an expression of the political stand taken by the 
second Blum government against the expansionist ambitions of Nazi-Germany, 
became the basis for a refugee policy similar to the hospitality afforded to Germans 
who fled to France after the Nazi takeover in 1933. Also those who claimed that they 
were Austrians and opposed the Nazi regime were protected by a set of bureaucratic 
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rules which were less restrictive than those applied to other foreigners. They were all 
granted a temporary residence permit. The Blum government did not last long and 
the more conservative Daladier government attacked the strategy outlined its 
predecessor. In the autumn of 1938, Austrians who had arrived illegally but who did 
not want to avail themselves of German protection were still tolerated, but controls 
became more severe. They now had to provide documentary proof of them being 
refugees and former Austrians arriving in France were no longer collectively a 
privileged category within alien policy. Even under the Blum regime, refugees from 
Nazi Germany with German passports had been excluded from this benevolence, but 
with the phasing out of the Austrian passports, more and more Austrian refugees 
were treated as Germans and handed an expulsion order. The final blow to the 
refugee policy created by the Blum government came in October 1938 when the 
Daladier cabinet decided that uninvited immigrants, even if they were Austrian 
refugees had to be stopped and only a very selective immigration was acceptable, 
controlled by consulates abroad. The immigrants who arrived in the country uninvited 
had to be returned. Only those travelling with German passports but claiming to be 
ex-Austrians and who could give firm proof that they were genuine refugees were to 
be tolerated. Only very few among those fleeing Greater Germany were granted an 
informal refugee status, exclusively political activists and the same applied to later 
arrivals from the Sudetenland and Czechoslovakia. 62  
This humanitarian exception to a stricter immigration policy was only 
conceded half-heartedly, as can be seen by the attitude towards communist 
refugees, the political activists on the run least wanted by all the liberal states of 
Western Europe. The new political leaders in France, having ousted the French 
communists from the government, nonetheless still tolerated communist refugees. 
Those who had left France to join the International Brigades in Spain in 1936 and 
1937 and who had returned in small batches by the end of 1938 were granted 
temporary residence permits, but at the same time they were banned from Paris and 
confined to small provincial towns cut off from their comrades.63 This dispersal of 
political refugees was meant to limit their political activism so as not to endanger the 
potential for French-German reconciliation while appeasement still held sway within 
the Daladier regime.64  
The privileged position afforded to political refugees remained a characteristic 
of the liberal states in Western Europe, and even the virulently anticommunist 
Netherlands officially became a sanctuary for ‘subversive’ refugees. This Dutch 
protection for these previously undeserving political refugees was a complete 
reversal of previous policy and prompted not by a spirit of greater tolerance, but by 
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changes in the communist movement itself and the domestic and international 
pressure on the Netherlands. Since 1933 exiled German communists in Western 
Europe had been mobilised by the KPD for full-time political work to support the 
communist resistance in Germany, a prerequisite to qualify for help from the Red 
Help. By 1938 the political leadership of these refugees was in jeopardy. The 
Comintern had strongly criticized the inability of the KPD to maintain any meaningful 
resistance to the Nazis inside Germany itself, and also castigated its failure to 
implement a Popular Front strategy after 1935. The Stalinist purges and defeat in the 
Spanish Civil War added to a climate of demoralization among German communists. 
Internal divisions and disorganisation of the KPD caused the KPD to lose hold over 
its members in exile. German communist refugees became dependent on the 
strategies of communist parties of the countries of asylum.  
At the same time the communist Popular Front strategy had changed the 
priorities of the national sections of the Red Help. International solidarity had been 
directed away from supporting exiles and towards supporting the Spanish Republic. 
Likewise there were attempts to find political allies within the country in line with the 
Popular Front strategy. These new obligations for the Red Help were detrimental to 
the German communist refugees who thus received a diminishing share of the 
organisation’s scarce resources. The international communist movement decided to 
sacrifice the political activism of German communists in exile, so that its resources 
could be allocated for other (national) goals.  
The refugees were forced to legalize their residence in host societies in order 
to enable them to provide for their own livelihood. Providing for their own income 
forced the refugees to limit their political activity.65 When a refugee applied for 
legalization of their stay, usually via the Red Help as intermediary, cessation of all 
political activity was mostly invariably imposed as a condition. However in the case of 
the Netherlands, the authorities refused to negotiate with the Dutch Red Help about 
the legalisation of communist refugees. Only when a ‘neutral’ refugee organisation 
was set up by mid-1938 - in the wake of the Popular Front strategy - in order to 
attract non-communist militants and to underline national solidarity - were the Dutch 
authorities ready to legalise the residence of most communist refugees in the 
Netherlands. Nevertheless, they continued to suppress any political activity by these 
‘subversive’ refugees and in mid-1939 there were about 50 communist refugees in 
custody, and the few KPD refugees still in contact with the resistance in Germany 
itself had to remain underground.66  
The Dutch change of policy cannot be entirely attributed to changes in the 
communist movement. They were also under strong international pressures to 
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liberalize refugee policy. The bilateral treaty enacted with Belgium in April 1937 
bound the Dutch to accept political refugees for whom the Netherlands was the first 
country of asylum. Unwanted political refugees could no longer be moved on to 
Belgium and as repatriation to Germany was considered unacceptable, the Dutch 
authorities had to come to terms with these refugees. Nevertheless, the Belgian 
communists strongly criticised the ‘extradition’ of their comrades for whom the  
Netherlands was the first country of asylum. The Belgian authorities demanded 
guarantees that those returned would receive fair treatment from the Dutch 
authorities. From April 1938 onwards, the Dutch authorities agreed to inform the 
Belgians as to how the German political refugees were to be treated on their return. 
The refugee could remain at large in the Netherlands, he or she could be interned or 
even repatriated to Germany. The Belgian decision was then made depending on 
what awaited the refugee in the Netherlands. As the Belgian authorities did not use 
force to make these political refugees leave the country, this information was also 
used to convince these refugees to return to the Netherlands. The Dutch authorities 
were bound by this agreement for a year and were required to inform the Belgians of 
any alterations brought about by changing circumstances.67 These concessions to 
the Belgian authorities increased the transparency and accountability of the Dutch 
refugee policy at local, provincial and federal levels. A third factor explaining the 
Dutch change of course was the increasing use in public discussion of the notion of 
’protecting political refugees’ as a basic principle of the liberal state. Throughout 1938 
it was repeated time and again that the Netherlands protected the ‘real’ refugees, 
those fleeing because of their political activities. This statement meant that the Dutch 
authorities had to live up to their promises and it became increasingly difficult to 
exclude communists from the group who were entitled to some privileges.  
 
Jewish refugees and the loss of (temporary) protection  
 
For domestic consumption, decision-makers all over Western Europe claimed that 
they had strengthened immigration control, but at the same time they commonly 
expressed the mantra that this was done in a humanitarian way as the real, political 
refugees continued to be protected. The strengthening of immigration control had 
however a pernicious influence on the protection of Jewish refugees. The inflow of 
Jews was the subject of increasing opposition and repressive means to handle this 
uninvited immigration, be it forced deportation or imprisonment, gained increasing 
acceptance among policy makers and the public at large. Irrespective of the size of 
the local Jewish community and the number of the refugees already in the country, 
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the arguments legitimising restrictive measures were very similar in all the countries 
considered. The dangers of economic competition and the need to curtail 
unemployment, which had been central in bolstering a protectionist alien policy in the 
first half of the 1930s remained part of this restrictionist discourse. There was also 
the oft-expressed fear that the inflow of Jewish refugees would create a ‘Jewish 
problem’ as these new arrivals aroused antisemitic feeling among the population.68 
The notion of Uberfremdung had been restricted to Swiss political discourse until the 
mid 1930s, but by the end of the decade it had found adherents among top-level 
bureaucrats and policy makers in all the liberal state of Europe. This xenophobic and 
even antisemitic discourse protected itself against accusations of illiberalism or a-
humanitarianism by always underlining its commitment to national traditions of 
asylum. It was repeated time and again that political refugees were still granted 
asylum. The protection of ‘refugees’ thus remained assured. On the other hand it was 
argued that Jewish refugees were subject to less danger than political refugees and 
thus less in need of protection.69  
The Netherlands was the first to abandon the policy for ‘Jewish’ refugees 
formulated in 1933, but here decision-making was more complex and included local 
as well as national authorities. As mentioned before, by May 1938 the Dutch 
authorities had changed their border policy by refusing admission to (‘Jewish’) 
refugees, at the same time the policy of temporary protection for these refugees was 
exchanged for a more coercive policy towards those refugees ‘who had left their 
country under pressure of circumstances…without being really in mortal danger’.70 
The Procurator-General in Amsterdam decided that imprisonment in a concentration 
camp was not sufficient reason for receiving refugee status in the Netherlands and 
he even couched his decision in anti-Nazi terms by stating that ‘the Netherlands will 
not submit to these questionable German practices’.71 This tougher policy did not go 
unchallenged, even within the Dutch government. The Dutch Foreign Ministry was 
content to see a more robust policy at the border but was unwilling to countenance 
deporting Jewish refugees already in the country. These deportations tarnished the 
Dutch image as a country of asylum - just at a time when the Ministry was eager to 
polish up the country’s image at the League of Nations.72   
The harsh judgement on ‘Jewish’ refugees provoked a public reaction and 
when some Jewish refugees committed suicide during their repatriation, the protests 
became louder.73  The path from legislation to implementation is often indistinct and 
we do not have conclusive data as to how many undocumented Jewish refugees 
were indeed deported as this was habitually carried out in secret, but tracking down 
refugees, detaining them and then deporting them was also extremely resource-
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intensive. The harsh language in the circular letters from government ministries 
tended to be moderated by the oral communication to local authorities given by the 
responsible civil servants. There was a certain reluctance to deny ‘Jews’ from 
Greater Germany protection completely. Thus for example, ‘after fierce protest 
against expulsion’ the asylum requests of alleged victims of persecution for 
Rassenschande or currency smuggling were to be submitted to the Minister of 
Justice. According to the civil servant in charge, granting this request would pose 
problems, because these persons ‘had placed themselves in a position in which they 
knew to expect difficulties’, but local authorities could in the meantime postpone the 
forced repatriation of alleged victims of persecution.74 The autonomy afforded to local 
authorities added to this inconclusive picture. There are, however, indications of a 
radicalisation in Dutch deportation policy. Up to that point, repatriations had been 
mostly conducted on an individual basis, but some local authorities then began 
experimenting with collective deportations. In September 1938 44 ‘Jews’ from 
Vienna, including 7 minors embarked on a ship in Cologne, in collusion with the 
German police. The ship sailed to Rotterdam and crossed the frontier undetected by 
Dutch officials. Upon arrival in the port of Rotterdam the passengers were 
immediately arrested. The Rotterdam police decided to repatriate them in two buses 
The head of police in Rotterdam considered the advantage of a collective repatriation 
that suicide attempts would not occur so easily when the refugees were ‘en famille’.75  
The Dutch authorities were not the only ones to take energetic action against 
the mass migration from Greater Germany. As Vicki Caron shows in her article in this 
volume, from May 1938 onwards, the French authorities used prison terms as a 
mean to convince ‘Jewish’ refugees to leave France. The French executive 
prevented any flexibility being exercised by the judiciary, as the courts were not 
permitted any discretion in taking account of specific individual circumstances. An 
internal crackdown of unprecedented severity followed and thousands of refugees 
landed in jail.76  
As mentioned before, shortly after the Dutch decision to abort the protection 
for ‘Jewish’ refugees and the French decision to convict these refugees for illegal 
immigration the Luxemburg authorities implemented a high profile show of strength 
policy towards ‘Jewish’ refugees dumped by the Germans on their territory. Also 
Dutch policy had been induced by dumping practices of the German authorities, but 
in Luxemburg the authorities responded to the German policy in an even more 
spectacular way. However, public criticism and the readiness of Jewish charities to 
guarantee the upkeep and re-emigration of the refugees caused the Luxembourg 
authorities to return to the old policy of temporarily protecting ‘Jewish’ refugees after 
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this one incident and a very quick increase in the number of ‘Jewish’ refugees in 
Luxemburg. By the middle of August, the Socialist Minister of Justice, René Blum 
decided to close the border and also to repatriate ‘Jewish’ refugees. The local Jewish 
refugee committee, which did not have the means to meet the needs of this massive 
influx, agreed with the government that immigration had to be restricted. That same 
day, Blum gave instructions to his civil servants not to inform the press in any way 
about deportations. Blum had learned from the experience of May 1938 that 
expulsions were a sensitive issue and ones that should be kept as far as possible 
from the public.77 As Regula Ludi shows in her chapter, the Swiss authorities decided 
to resort to the deportation of most ‘Jewish’ refugees at that time too. All those who 
had arrived illegally and had been found in the country after 19 August were to be 
returned to Greater Germany.  
At the end of September 1938 Belgium joined Switzerland, the Netherlands 
and Luxemburg by deciding to abolish the temporary protection for ‘Jewish’ refugees 
and by enforcing their return to Greater Germany. On 30 September 1938 Joseph 
Pholien, the Catholic Minister of Justice launched a secret operation. He gave 
instructions to the municipal police in Brussels to arrest any Austrian ‘Jews’ living 
illegally in the country. Roundups took place in hotels and refugees were arrested in 
police stations when they came to report their arrival to the authorities, after being 
told to do so by the Jewish refugee committee. This netted at least 250 Austrian 
‘Jews’ in a fortnight and about 150 of them were rapidly repatriated to Germany. One 
of the repatriates managed to poison himself on the journey and had to be treated in 
a Belgian hospital close to the border.78  
There was generally little public opposition to these increasingly restrictive 
practices and there was a consensus across Western Europe that a strict policy was 
necessary. Nevertheless, governments increasingly chose to alter policies through 
secret instructions and directives to the police forces and the local authorities, rather 
than to tinker with the legal framework, which would have involved a public debate. 
Yet this could not be avoided entirely as ministers had to defend their country's 
record on the admission of refugees in parliament.  There was hardly any discussion 
on the general nature of border controls, but the arrest and expulsion of Jewish 
refugees already in the country became causes célébres and were sometimes hotly 
debated in both press and parliament. 
Only in Belgium can parliamentary debate, buttressed by a wider public 
discussion, be seen to have changed the course of state policy. Treating Jewish 
refugees like any other illegal immigrants and sending them back to their country of 
origin was a decision taken by the Catholic Minister of Justice Joseph Pholien in the 
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Catholic-Socialist-Liberal government led by Paul-Henri Spaak. This decision also 
has to be situated within a political struggle among the conservatives. Since 1936, 
the conservative wing of the Catholic party had been in a severe crisis due to 
scandals and the desertion of conservative Catholic voters to the extremist Rex 
party. In 1936 the Brussels lawyer and newcomer Joseph Pholien was launched in 
national politics as the new face of the discredited conservative wing of the Catholic 
party. Pholien was a very individualistic politician with hardly any support within the 
party apparatus, but at that time the party machine became increasingly important as 
the locus of power where political strategies were designed and party members were 
disciplined. Pholien hoped that by bringing the antisemitic or xenophobic card into 
play, just as the rival Rex had seemingly successfully done, his party would be able 
to regain ground among traditionally conservative electors. Repressive measures 
pandering to the populist groundswell against immigration were therefore considered 
as an electoral advantage.    
The expulsion of German ‘Jews’ immediately became known to Emile 
Vandervelde, the president of the Socialist Party through an informer in the prison 
where the ‘Jews’ were being held prior to repatriation. Although Vandervelde led the 
Belgian Socialists, he was unaware of political deals struck by the independently-
minded socialist Prime Minister Spaak, who took a far more pragmatic line in trying to 
maintain his political coalition. These differences caused severe frictions between the 
two men. Vandervelde chose to champion the cause of the ‘Jewish’ refugees and 
lobbied within his party to preserve an (informal) asylum for all ‘Jewish’ refugees in 
Belgium. The Jewish refugee aid committee in Brussels also wanted to restore the 
temporary protection of their clientele, but a mere return to the old policy seemed 
unrealistic and they tried to kill two birds with one stone by proposing the creation of 
a refugee camp as a solution. Such a camp, they argued, would act as deterrent to 
immigration for all but the most desperate (and most deserving) of cases. Some 
months earlier the Jewish refugee committee had already proposed setting up a 
refugee camp, similar to Swiss experiments, largely as a means of reducing the costs 
for the upkeep of refugees and providing professional training to make them more 
attractive for countries overseas. Greater control was also sought in order to reduce 
the incidence of prostitution and swindling among refugees. In October the motivation 
for setting up a camp shifted to making the Jewish refugees much less visible and 
thus minimising the increasing antisemitic agitation in the country. The camp thus 
became a means of reducing the public perception of immigration rather than a 
means of deterring future arrivals. The Socialist leadership went along with this 
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proposal and under pressure from his party colleagues, Prime Minister Spaak agreed 
to stop the expulsions and set up refugee camps.  
Pholien was strongly opposed to this change of policy and highlighted the 
dangers of tolerating further illegal immigration of ‘Jews’ from Nazi Germany. As 
neighbouring France and the Netherlands were toughening their policy, Belgium ran 
the risk of becoming the weak link in the chain and to be overwhelmed with refugees. 
He thus predicted, due to the increasing arrival of refugees and the slowing down of 
their departure to countries overseas, a rising antisemitism and the bankruptcy of 
Jewish aid committee. A refugee camp would only attract would-be immigrants. In 
spite of his protests, Pholien had to back down completely: a refugee camp was set 
up in Merksplas and on 15 October 1938, Pholien ordered a halt to the expulsions 
although this latter decision was not made public. The next day, Emile Vandervelde, 
still unaware of the decision taken at top level, published a fierce protest against the 
expulsion of Jewish refugees in the Socialist daily Le Peuple. Vandervelde, having 
seen no result from his lobbying the previous week, took his demand for a 
humanitarian immigration policy to the street in order to bring his prime minister back 
to the ranks.    
This public protest in Belgium caused immigration policy - which until then 
had been an uncontested prerogative of the executive power - to become a matter of 
public debate. Well-known members of the Jewish community and liberal politicians 
came out as advocates of the ‘Jewish’ refugees and criticized Joseph Pholien’s 
expulsion policy. In the face of this, the hard-headed Pholien continued to defend the 
expulsion of ‘Jewish’ refugee albeit in an unsubtle manner, effectively portraying 
himself as a callous hard-liner with no empathy at all with the refugees’ plight. He 
devalued their asylum claims by calling them economic immigrants and made a 
mockery of their suicide attempts. On 24 October, Vandervelde, obtained the backing 
of the council of socialist party and ordered ‘his’ Prime Minister Paul-Henry Spaak to 
stop the (already abandoned) expulsions immediately.79  
 
Enlisting German cooperation in immigration control  
 
The Anschluss of Austria brought individual protests from many Western European 
states against the German policy of dumping people across frontiers, albeit with no 
immediate  result.80 Consequently, the countries concerned developed preventive 
measures to arm themselves against future unwanted immigration. As the Nazi use 
of denaturalization as a form of persecution became more widespread, Belgium and 
the Netherlands began to insist that German citizens applying for a visa or arriving at 
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the border possessed an official German declaration that they could return at any 
time to Germany. The German authorities refused to issue such documents; affirming 
time and again that all Germans, including ‘Jews’, could always return to Germany.81 
This measure made travel for all Germans much more cumbersome and did lead to 
some German concessions to neighbouring states. A Belgian-German bilateral 
agreement concluded on 22 October 1938 stated explicitly that all German 
immigrants could return to Germany. In exchange for this guarantee the Belgian 
authorities agreed to the normalization of border controls for regular travellers from 
Germany.82 Clarifying that it was possible for all Germans to return to Germany 
placed the onus firmly on the ‘Jews’ for not wanting to return.  
The protests against the flight of Jews caused not only the German 
authorities to promise to allow their citizens to return, and as a result of negotiations 
with the Swiss and Swedish authorities, to mark their passports, but they made also 
promises that went beyond that. German-Swiss negotiations in September 1938 led 
to a German promise not only to mark the passports of the German ‘Jews’, but also 
to instruct the German border guards to prevent the holders of German ‘J’ passports 
from entering Switzerland if they did not have a Swiss visa.83 Similarly, the German-
Belgian agreement of 22 October 1938 stipulated that the German authorities would 
help to combat illegal immigration into Belgium. To honour these promises, the 
German authorities issued orders in early November 1938 to arrest all ‘Jews’ found 
near the border who did not have the documents necessary to enter Belgium, 
Switzerland or France. Male would-be emigrants were to be locked up in police 
prisons before transfer to a concentration camp, while women and children were 
merely removed from the border area. This German willingness to assist 
neighbouring countries was not entirely ‘philanthropic’ as it also served to prevent 
political activists from leaving the country and acted as a control to make sure that 
‘Jews’ were stripped of all their assets prior to their departure.84     
Numerous ‘Jews’ still tried to flee Nazi Germany by crossing the German 
border illegally and administrative capacities in the border areas were insufficient to 
enforce the orders properly.  For example in November 1938 the Staatspolizei office 
in Aachen could not handle the large number of mostly Austrian ‘Jews’ who had tried 
to emigrate without permission and had been caught. As the local police prison was 
full to overflowing and as the transfer of these Jewish prisoners to a concentration 
camp could not be executed swiftly the local authorities were obliged to set free a 
number of the Jewish would-be emigrants they had arrested. These ‘Jews’ were thus 
reprieved from a term in a concentration camp and were only removed from the 
border region.85  
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This cooperation in halting illegal immigration in the neighbouring countries 
represented a change of course in the manner in which the Nazis attempted the 
ethnic cleansing of the German Reich.86 While at the Eastern border the German 
authorities tried by every possible means to expedite emigration, on the western side 
they actively tried to prevent people from leaving.87  Thus from November 1938 
onwards, refugees trying to leave German soil for Belgium, France or Switzerland 
had to outwit the German as well as the Belgian, Swiss or French border guards and 
thus increasingly relied on the ever more expensive ‘passeurs’, who for substantial 
rewards would smuggle people across the frontier. 
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